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Abstract
This paper considers the eﬀects of changes in the income distribution in an
economy where agents’ utility depends both on consumption and on their rank
in the distribution of consumption of a positional good. We introduce a new
methodology to compare the behavior of agents that occupy the same rank in the
two diﬀerent income distributions but typically have diﬀerent levels of incomes,
and analyze equilibrium choices and welfare of every member of the society for
continuous distributions with arbitrary, even disjoint, ranges. If an income trans-
formation raises incomes at the lower end of the income distribution, the poor will
typically be better oﬀ. But because such an income transformation also increases
the degree of social competition, the middle class will typically be worse oﬀ - even
if they have higher incomes as well. An increase in incomes can make all better
oﬀ, but only if it is accompanied by an increase in income dispersion. Our new
techniques highlight the importance of density of social space as we demonstrate
that one can have an increase both in income and relative position but still be
worse oﬀ.
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1 Introduction
There is increasing acceptance amongst economists that people may care about their
relative position as well as the absolute level of their consumption. For example, a
survey of empirical research on happiness goes as far as to conclude that in determining
happiness “It is not the absolute level of income that matters most but rather one’s
position relative to other individuals” (Frey and Stutzer, 2002, p411). The importance
of relative comparisons finds further support in more recent research (Brown et al.
(2004); Luttmer (2005)). If this is the case, it seems a natural conclusion that greater
inequality would worsen the degree of social competition (Frank (1999)) when the middle
classes are confronted with the greater aﬄuence of the rich. This would seem to give
a new justification for policies to reduce inequality. However, it turns out that this
argument is problematic. In earlier work (Hopkins and Kornienko (2004)), we were
able to extend the analysis of the model of relative concerns of Frank (1985) so that we
could characterize how equilibrium behavior and equilibrium utility changed in response
to changes in the distribution of income. We found that, surprisingly, greater equality
could lead to an increase in conspicuous consumption and a reduction in welfare for those
with low and middle incomes. Thus, even in the presence of relative concerns, greater
equality is not necessarily welfare-enhancing. Furthermore, we found that greater social
wealth decreases satisfaction at any given level of income.
It has been argued to us, however, that our “equality hurts the poor” and “economic
growth hurts everybody” results may be misleading. Often, when one thinks of a
reduction in inequality, one thinks, for example, of an increase in income of all the
poor, rather than a change that keeps the incomes of some poor people constant. Or
when one thinks of economic growth, one thinks of an increase in income of all. Yet
our earlier methodology did not allow us to address such situations. Instead, it only
allowed us, in eﬀect, to investigate the behavior of agents whose income did not change
as the income of those around them did. In fact, such limitations are inevitable if one
follows the established tradition and analyzes consumer behavior as a function of her
income (as we did). Besides, as the model of relative concerns initially considered by
Frank (1985) turned out to be formally similar to first price auctions, we borrowed
our earlier techniques from auction theory. These borrowed techniques were fruitful
insofar they allowed us to solve the game and to make comparative statics predictions.
However, they only allowed us to compare equilibrium outcomes under two diﬀerent
income distributions for a given level of income, and thus, only for the distributions
with the same support. We now believe that we can do better.
In this paper, we develop a new set of techniques created specifically for problems of
social comparison. We re-examine games of status where agents care about their relative
position in terms of their rank in expenditure on a visible positional good, and analyze
consumer choice as a function of rank rather than income. This new methodology
allows us to compare the equilibrium behavior and well-being of every individual for a
pair of continuous distributions with arbitrary, even disjoint, ranges. We still find that
greater equality provides greater incentives to spend on the visible positional good in
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order to diﬀerentiate oneself. If an income transformation raises incomes at the lower
end of the income distribution, the poor will typically be better oﬀ. But as an increase
in equality increases the degree of social competition, the middle class will typically be
worse oﬀ - even if they have higher incomes as well. We find that to make all better oﬀ
it is suﬃcient to raise incomes provided at the same time there is an increase in income
dispersion.
In our current work and our earlier paper, Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), we use
the same model derived from that of Frank (1985), where individuals must decide how
to divide their income between consumption of a normal good and a positional good.
For example, one might care about the characteristics of one’s car, but also about
how it compares to those of one’s neighbours. The choice of the positional good is
therefore strategic, in that consumption choices of my neighbours aﬀect my payoﬀs, as
my choice aﬀects theirs. The symmetric Nash equilibrium of the resulting game will be
Pareto ineﬃcient in that all will spend more on the positional good than is privately
optimal, but will result in no net change in relative position. That is, everyone increases
conspicuous consumption in order to improve status, but any gain in status is cancelled
out by the similarly increased expenditure of others. A salient question in this context
is how the distribution of income aﬀects the degree of social competition and, hence,
the amount of excess consumption.
In such a model, however, changes in the income distribution can aﬀect agents
through three channels. One’s own income, one’s relative position or rank in the dis-
tribution, and the shape of the distribution all matter. Of necessity, any analysis must
hold at least of one of these constant. In our earlier work, we considered changes in
the distribution of income that left some people’s incomes unchanged. (For example,
imagine a change in taxes on earned income that does not aﬀect incomes of those who
do not work.) We then analysed the eﬀect of the change in the distribution of income
on equilibrium behavior and utility at each income level. We found that a reduction of
inequality of this type would lead to a fall in utility at low income levels.
Here, instead, we perform the comparative statics analysis for a fixed rank, and find,
as we did before, that an increase in equality increases the degree of social competition.
The closer individuals are together, the easier it is to overtake others in status, thus
giving a greater incentive to indulge in conspicuous consumption. This means that the
overall eﬀect of redistribution on the poor is ambiguous: they have greater income,
but more of it may be spent on wasteful consumption. Typically, with their income
increased, the poor are better oﬀ in a more equal society, yet the lower middle class are
worse oﬀ - even though they may also have higher income. This is because the increase
aﬄuence of those at the bottom results in their higher expenditure on visible positional
goods, forcing everyone “further up” the social ladder to increase their spending as well
in order to “keep up” - and for most, this increased expenditure on positional goods
comes at the expense of their expenditure of non-positional goods, leading to a decline
in post-redistribution welfare. The eﬀect on those with average or greater income is
definitely negative. This is in contrast to the eﬀect of a reduction in inequality in
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Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), where the eﬀect on the rich was ambiguous, and on the
poor was definitely negative.
We hope these contrasting results may help to explain why it has been diﬃcult to
establish empirically whether greater equality does in fact lead to greater happiness.
Clark (2003), using British panel data, finds a positive relationship between inequality
and self-reported happiness while Senik (2004) finds that inequality has no statistical
influence on life satisfaction in post-reform Russia. In contrast, Alesina et al. (2004)
find a negative relationship between inequality and happiness for both Europe and the
US. Our results suggest that, even in the presence of relative concerns, whether greater
equality does increase utility or happiness may depend quite sensitively on the measure
of equality considered and on the method of comparison.
In fact, the new techniques also allow us to look at the following contentious issue.
Prior to 1970s, the economics profession held a consensus regarding the benefits of
economic growth, as it seemed obvious that an increase in real income of every individual
(and thus an increase in the level of consumption) leads to an increase in happiness of
every individual. However, Easterlin (1974) pointed out that data on happiness across
time and countries did not support this simple hypothesis.1 Concerns with relative
position are a likely culprit, in that happiness increases significantly in cross-section even
if average happiness does not rise strongly in response to increases in average income. In
a way, Easterlin’s observation posed a challenge to the profession as to whether one can
find a condition for an increase of happiness of every individual when relative concerns
are present. Contrary to the standard neoclassical result, our earlier result suggests that
one will be unhappy with an unchanged income when other people’s incomes grow. But
our earlier methodology did not allow us to explore whether an increase in incomes of
everyone increases everyone’s happiness. Here, we suggest that it is possible for every
agent to be made better oﬀ when everyone experiences an increase in income, provided
at the same time, incomes become no less dispersed and so there is no increase in
social competition. Another way to see our suﬃcient condition for happiness, imagine
an income transformation whereby the income of the lowest member in the society
increased (or stayed the same) while everyone else faces such an increase in income that
results in a decrease in “social competitiveness” (by which we mean a decrease in the
density of the income distribution at every rank).
Notice that our techniques allows us to avoid the problems of interpersonal com-
parisons as we can make ordinal comparisons of utilities for the same individual before
and after an income transformation. If the income transformation is rank-preserving,
each individual will have the same rank before and after the income transformation,
and thus we can apply our rank-indexing technique directly. We find that even if the
income transformation is not rank-preserving, one can still carry out ordinal compar-
isons for the same individual by correcting for ranks by means of a rank transformation
function. Non-rank-preserving transformations highlight the importance of the density
1Easterlin’s findings have been found significant support in subsequent research. See Frey and
Stutzer (2002) for a survey.
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of the social space, as we provide an example where individuals may have both higher
income and higher rank, but because of the increased density of their social space they
may be worse oﬀ.
Finally, both the model presented here and the model in our earlier work (Hopkins
and Kornienko (2004)) can also be interpreted as models of labor supply, as they can
apply to situations where individuals decide on how to allocate their endowment of
productivity (rather than of income) between labor and leisure, and where status or
prestige is assigned to the most productive workers. In equilibrium individuals choose
a level of labor which is higher than that which would be privately optimal - that is, in
terms of labor supply, they overwork. As increased education changes the productivity
endowments (making the “social space” to be less dispersed), the increased competition
leads to further worker dissatisfaction.2
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model and
show that strategies and equilibrium outcomes can be written in terms of rank in the
distribution of income. In Section 3 we compare the two methodologies in games of
status - one indexing individuals by their level of income, and the other indexing by rank.
In Sections 4 and 5 we utilize the concept of dispersive ordering and conduct comparative
static analysis. In Section 6 we show that our techniques can be useful for comparing
individual’s choices and welfare for non-rank-preserving income transformations. In the
conclusion, we discuss the applicability and limitations of both methodologies.
2 The Model
Following Frank (1985) and Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) (hereafter “HK”), we con-
sider a simple model where individuals care about their social status as determined by
their (conspicuous) consumption of a visible (positional) good, as well as absolute level
of (conspicuous) consumption of this visible (positional) good x and absolute level of
(non-conspicuous) consumption of another (non-positional) good y, the consumption
of which is not directly observable by other agents. We assume an economy consisting
of a continuum of agents, identical except in terms of income. Each agent is endowed
with a level of income z which is private information and is an independent draw from
a common distribution. This is described by a distribution function G(z) which is twice
continuously diﬀerentiable with a strictly positive density on some interval [z, z¯] with
z ≥ 0.
Agents’ choices of conspicuous consumption are aggregated in a distribution of con-
spicuous consumption F (·), with F (x) being the mass of individuals with consumption
less than or equal to x. Following Frank (1985) and Robson (1992), an agent’s status
will be determined by her position in the distribution of conspicuous consumption, with
2See Schor (1991) and (1998) for a vivid description of both overspending and overworking behavior
of modern Americans.
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higher consumption meaning higher status. Following HK, we define status as follows:
S(x, F (·)) = δF (x) + (1− δ)F−(x) + S0 (1)
where x is individual’s consumption, δ ∈ [0, 1), F (x) is the mass of individuals with
consumption less or equal to x, and F−(x) = limx0→x− F (x0) is the mass of individuals
with consumption strictly less than x. The current formulation is a way of dealing with
ties. For example, if all agents chose the same level of consumption in one sense they
would all be “equal first”, but it is unlikely that they would gain the same level of
satisfaction as someone who was uniquely first. To reflect this, the current assumption
would award them status equal to δ which is strictly less than one.3 In contrast, if the
distribution of consumption F (x) is continuous, there are no ties, the above measure of
status is identical to rank in consumption, or S(x, F (·)) = F (x). The parameter S0 ≥ 0
is a constant representing a guaranteed minimum level of status, reflecting the intensity
of social pressures. We discuss its role below.
We follow HK, and assume that individuals have identical preferences over absolute
consumptions and status as follows:
U(x, y, S(x, F (·))) = V (x, y)S(x, F (·)) (2)
In eﬀect, V (·) is a conventional utility function over the two goods, x and y, and
we assume that it is non-negative, strictly increasing in both its arguments, strictly
quasiconcave and twice diﬀerentiable. We further assume that Vii ≤ 0 for i = 1, 2 and
that Vij ≥ 0 for i 6= j. As agents simultaneously decide how to allocate their endowment
z between consumption x and saving y, each agent faces the following problem,
max
x,y
V (x, y)
¡
δF (x) + (1− δ)F−(x) + S0
¢
subject to px+ y ≤ z, x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0 (3)
where p is the price of the positional good. The price of the non-positional good is
normalized to one.
As individuals are in competition for status, that implies that their choice of con-
sumption of diﬀerent types of goods is strategic. Note that the distribution of con-
spicuous consumption F (·) is endogenously determined, so is social status S(x, F (·)).
Thus, a rational individual makes a consumption choice in anticipation of consumption
choices of all other individuals, i.e. is engaged in a game of status. It is possible to solve
the resulting game but the solution will, however, depend on the distribution of income
in society. This game has a formal resemblance to a first-price auction, as increasing
one’s conspicuous consumption leads to a trade-oﬀ between the increase in status and
the decrease in non-conspicuous consumption component of utility, just as a bidder in
an auction trades oﬀ an increase in probability of winning for lower realized profits in
the event of winning.
HK concentrated on a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which all agents use the same
strategy, defined as a mapping x(z) from income to expenditure. However, given an
3This also gives agents an incentive to break any ties, so, as we will see, there will be no ties in
equilibrium. See Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) for a full rationale of this specification.
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income distribution G(z), an agent of income z˜ has rank r˜ = G(z˜) and it is equally
valid to think of his type as being r˜ as much as it is z˜.4 We can also write his income
as a function of his rank or z˜ = G−1(r˜) (i.e. z˜ is at the r˜-quantile). Note an important
distinction. While in everyday speech, “rank” and “status” are almost synonymous,
here we use the two terms to signify two diﬀerent things. Rank we take to be an agent’s
true, exogenous rank in the underlying distribution of income, or r = G(z). Status
S, however, is endogenously determined by visible expenditure on positional goods in
comparison with the expenditures of others according to the function (1). In any case,
we now consider a symmetric Nash equilibrium defined as a mapping x(r) from rank to
expenditure.
That is, a symmetric equilibrium will be a Nash equilibrium in which all agents use
the same strategy, that is, the same mapping x(r) from rank in income to conspicuous
consumption. Suppose all agents adopt the same increasing, diﬀerentiable strategy
x(r) and consider whether any individual agent has an incentive to deviate. Suppose
that instead of following the strategy followed by the others, an agent with rank ri
chooses xi = x(r˜), that is, she consumes as though she had rank r˜. Note first that
F (xi) = x
−1(xi) = r˜, resulting in Si = S0 + r˜, and second that her utility would be
equal to
U = V (x(r˜), G−1(ri)− px(r˜))(S0 + r˜).
We diﬀerentiate this with respect to r˜. Then, given that in a symmetric equilibrium,
the agent uses the equilibrium strategy and so r˜ = ri, this gives the first order condition,
V (xi, G
−1(ri)−pxi)+(S0+ri)x0(ri)
¡
V1(xi, G
−1(ri)− pxi)− pV2(xi, G−1(ri)− pxi)
¢
= 0.
(4)
This first order condition therefore defines a diﬀerential equation,5
x0(r) =
V (x,G−1(r)− px)
pV2(x,G−1(r)− px)− V1(x,G−1(r)− px)
1
S0 + r
=
φ(x,G−1(r))
S0 + r
(5)
An important point to recognize is that this diﬀerential equation and the equilibrium
strategy, which is its solution, both depend on the distribution of income r = G(z).
Our next step is to specify what Frank (1985) and HK call the “cooperative choice”,
which is an optimal consumption choice (xc(r), yc(r)) when an individual does not
or cannot aﬀect her social status. This choice corresponds to the standard tangency
4We have assumed that G(·) is strictly increasing on its support so that there is a one-to-one relation
between income and rank.
5As we will see, the analysis of equilibrium choices under rank-indexing approach is much simpler
than under income-indexing approach. To see that, compare equation (5) to the equation 6 in Hopkins
and Kornienko (2004):
dx(z)
dz
=
µ
g(z)
S0 +G(z)
¶µ
V
pV2 − V1
¶
=
dx(r)
dr
dr
dz
=
dx(r)
dr
g(z)
In other words, under income-indexing, the analysis of equilibrium decisions is complicated by the
presence of income density g(z) in the diﬀerential equation. As we will see later on (see footnote 10),
the reverse is true of the analysis of equilibrium utilities.
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condition: V1(xc, yc)/V2(xc, yc) = p. Given the budget constraint pxc(r) + yc(r) =
G−1(r), one can rewrite the above tangency condition as:
V1(x
c(r), G−1(r)− pxc(r))
V2(xc(r), G−1(r)− pxc(r))
= p. (6)
Let xc(r) be the strategy implied by the above condition. The cooperative strategy also
enables us to fix the appropriate boundary condition for the diﬀerential equation (5).
This is not a purely technical question. As we will see, equilibrium behavior is quite
diﬀerent in the two diﬀerent cases, where S0 minimum guaranteed status is zero, and
when it is positive. Thus, the initial conditions, or the choices of the individual with
the lowest rank zero are:
S0 = 0 ⇒ x(0) =
G−1(0)
p
S0 > 0 ⇒ x(0) = xc(0) (7)
When S0 is positive, the lowest ranked individual does not take part in social compe-
tition and spends only the cooperative amount on visible consumption. In complete
contrast, when S0 = 0, low ranked individuals are desperate and spend all their endow-
ment in a futile attempt to get ahead. While these boundary conditions were of crucial
importance in the endowment-based approach of HK, with rank-based indexing these
play less prominent role. Hopkins and Kornienko (2004, Proposition 1) also showed
the following. In the original, the equilibrium strategy was expressed as a function of
income, but as there is smooth mapping z = G−1(r), the results are easily carried over.
Proposition 1 The diﬀerential equation (5) with boundary conditions (7) has a unique
solution which is an essentially unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game of sta-
tus. Equilibrium conspicuous consumption x(r) is greater than in the absence of status
concerns, that is x(r) > xc(r) on (0, 1].
The equilibrium is only “essentially” unique as when S0 = 0, as there is other
possible equilibrium behavior for the agent with the lowest income. Specifically, given
the necessary condition for equilibrium limz→z+ x(z) = z, the agent with income z will
always have rank zero and always have zero utility and so is indiﬀerent between any
choice of x on the range [0, z/p]. The specific boundary condition that x(0) = G−1(0)/p,
she spends all her income, is not crucial to our analysis but is used for convenience.
3 Indexing by Rank vs. Indexing by Income
In this paper as in our earlier work (Hopkins and Kornienko (2004)) (HK) we look
at games of status. In HK we found that changes in income distributions translate
into changes in individual consumption choices. The techniques we used to show this
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were first developed in the literature on the first price auctions. In general in games
of incomplete information, it is customary to identify individuals by their type, a draw
from an exogenous distribution of characteristics. In the games of status we consider,
agents only diﬀer in terms of income. So, at first, we found it to be natural to write
equilibrium consumption choices and equilibrium utility as functions of income, or x(z)
and U(x(z), z − px(z), S(z)) = U(z) respectively. We then analyzed how a change in
income distributions aﬀects the choices made and utility received at each income level.
However, while this approach to games of status has proved to be useful, it has some
limitations.
Our principal interest is the eﬀect of changes in income distribution on equilibrium
behavior and well-being. Yet, take, for example, a redistributive scheme which raises the
income of all those with below average income, while taxing all those with above average
income. Since the income of every agent changes, it is diﬃcult to make comparisons at
a given level of income. In particular, there are income levels that no longer exist after
the change. For example, imagine the lowest income ex ante was $5000, but ex post
was $6000. We cannot compare how it feels to have $5000 before and after the changes,
as after the changes there is no-one with that income. Thus, to avoid this problem, in
HK we looked at changes in the income distribution that did not change its support.
This is important despite the conventional assumption is that the support should
not matter.6 Yet in the games of status the density of incomes matters a great deal, and
this conventional wisdom turns out to be misleading. One of the principal findings of
HK was that a higher density of the income distribution increased the degree of social
competition: the closer people are together, the easier it is to surpass them with a
slight increase in conspicuous consumption. When one keeps the support of the income
distribution constant, a stochastically higher income distribution is only possible if
there is an increase in density among the relatively well-oﬀ. That is, it is not possible
to increase incomes without increasing the degree of social competition. However, if
one is allowed diﬀerent supports, then this is no longer necessary. In the current work,
we look at a larger set of changes to income distributions, including those that alter
the support of the distribution. For example, if everyone in society receives an extra
$1 then the income distribution moves to the right, with its density unchanged. In this
case, we have higher incomes without greater social competition, and thus everyone is
better oﬀ.
The second issue is whether comparison at a constant level of income makes sense.
In our original work (HK), it helped to contrast the behavior of agents with concerns for
status with behavior under standard preferences. If the incomes of others change, this
would normally have no eﬀect on the consumption choices of an agent with unchanged
income. But we were able to show that, when there are concerns for relative position,
changes in the distribution of income can change outcomes at every level of income.
For example, in Figure 1 one of these results is illustrated. An individual with income
6Given two distributions on diﬀerent supports, one can approximate either distribution arbitrarily
closely with a distribution which has support on the union of the two original supports.
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Figure 1: Comparative statics: income indexing vs. rank indexing. The top right
panel represents the relationship between income and rank for two distributions Ga and
Gp, with Gp being stochastically higher than Ga. The bottom right panel represents
the comparative statics of welfare under the income indexing approach of Hopkins and
Kornienko (2004). The top left panel represents the comparative statics of welfare under
the new rank-indexing approach.
z0 has higher rank under the initial income distribution Ga(z) than under the sto-
chastically higher income distribution Gp(z) (in the top right panel Ga(z0) > Gp(z0)),
and subsequently has higher utility under the initial income distribution Ga(z) than
under the stochastically higher income distribution Gp(z) (in the bottom right panel
Up(z0) < Ua(z0)). That is, someone whose own income is unchanged, is made worse
oﬀ by the improved situation of others. Nonetheless, such comparisons may not be the
most appropriate for policy questions. For the income distribution to improve in the
sense of stochastic dominance, someone must have gained in income. Yet, our previous
methodology by making comparisons at constant income in eﬀect looked at those who
were left behind by such a change rather than those that benefitted. More generally,
the assessment of some policy is often based on what happens to the average or median
individual, or what happens to the bottom or top decile. That is, the comparison is of-
ten at a particular social position, not a level of income (presumably for similar reasons
that income changes over time and because of policy interventions).
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Thus, in this paper we index individuals by their rank in the income distribution,
rather than by their income. In particular, we use the relation r = G(z) or z =
G−1(r) to write strategies and equilibrium utilities as functions of an agent’s rank not
her income. That is, x(r) and U(x(r), G−1(r) − px(r), S0 + r) = U(r) respectively.
As in HK, equilibrium strategies depend on the distribution of income and, once the
distribution changes, so does equilibrium behavior. Rank-based indexing actually allows
us to consider a broader class of distributional changes than in HK. In particular, the
rank-indexing approach is devoid of this unequal domain problem and is quite capable
of comparing two income distributions that have diﬀerent, even disjoint, supports.7
These two diﬀerent approaches generate results that sometimes can seem contradic-
tory. For example, in HK we have the result that if the income distribution changes
so that the new distribution (first order) stochastically dominates the old, equilib-
rium utility U(z) falls at every level of income. This is illustrated in Figure 1, where
Ua(z) > Up(z) for almost all incomes z (in the bottom right panel). Compare again
an individual with income z0 having rank r0 in the original distribution Ga. If after
income transformation she still has the same income z0 in the new distribution Gp, she
would be worse oﬀ in this new distribution, i.e. Ua(z0) > Up(z0) (in the bottom right
panel). But suppose we compared utilities not at a constant level of income, but at
a constant rank. That is, suppose our individual with initial income z0 has the same
rank r0 both in the initial distribution Ga and in the new distribution Gp. Figure 1
shows a result that we will go on to prove: this individual can have greater utility in
the new distribution, i.e. Up(r0) > Ua(r0) (in the top left panel). However, this is not
a contradiction to the result in HK. This is because since she still occupies the same
position in the new distribution Gp, she will have the higher income z1.8 Her utility of
her new income z1 in the new distribution Gp exceeds her utility of her old income z0
in the old distribution Ga (the bottom right panel). Thus, the same change analysed
using the same model gives diﬀerent results when diﬀerent forms of comparisons are
used.
There is another important feature of games of status. Observe that because income
and rank stand in a reciprocal relationship to each other, the density of the individual’s
“rank space” is reciprocal of the density of her “income space”:
dG−1(r)
dr
=
1
g(G−1(r))
(8)
Thus, the two “sides of the social coin” aﬀect the return to happiness in a reciprocal
way. In other words, take people around a given individual with rank r. The more
densely packed are these individuals in the “rank space” - and, reciprocally, the more
sparsely packed they are in the “income space” - the higher is the marginal return to
7We hope that the techniques developed here could also used to advantage in first price auctions as
well.
8By the definition of stochastic dominance Gp(z) ≤ Ga(z) for all z. This implies that, for a given
income one’s rank is lower in the stochastically higher distribution, and for a given rank, one’s income
is higher in the higher distribution.
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rg(z)
z
dG−1(r)
dr
ra = Ga(z)
ra = Ga(z)
rp = Gp(z)
rp = Gp(z)
gp(z)
ga(z)
dG−1p (r)
dr
dG−1a (r)
dr
z¯
1
Figure 2: Densities vs. inverse densities. The top right panel represents the relationship
between income and rank for two distributions Ga and Gp, with Gp being more “equal”
than Ga. The bottom right panel represents the densities of the two distributions, ga(z)
and gp(z). The top left panel represents the inverse densities of the two distributions,
dG−1a (r)
dr
and dG
−1
p (r)
dr
.
happiness from rank, and vice versa (see Figure 2). This observation will be important
for our argument to follow.
In order to get clear-cut analytical results, for each method, we employ a corre-
sponding partial ordering of income distributions. Under income-indexing we used the
concepts of first and second order stochastic dominance, as well as their strengthenings
based on the likelihood ratio order, or the ratio of densities (which is the ratio of com-
petitiveness in the income space). Here we use another way of ordering distributions
which is based on ranking distributions based on the ratio of the inverse densities (which
is the ratio of competitiveness in the rank space).
In particular, here we use the dispersive ordering discussed in detail by Shaked (1982)
(see also references therein) and Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994). Let F and G be
two arbitrary continuous distribution functions with arbitrary, even disjoint, supports
and let F−1 and G−1 be the corresponding left-continuous inverses (so that F−1(t) =
inf{x : F (x) ≥ r}, r ∈ [0, 1] and G−1(r) = inf{x : G(x) ≥ t}, r ∈ [0, 1]), and let f and
g be the respective densities. Income in the society with income distribution F is said
to be smaller in the dispersive order (or less dispersed) than income in the society with
income distribution G (denoted as F ≺disp G) whenever
F−1(r2)− F−1(r1) ≤ G−1(r2)−G−1(r1) whenever 0 < r1 ≤ r2 < 1
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That is, the income diﬀerence between individuals ranked r1 and r2 in both societies is
no greater in the society with distribution F then in the society with distribution G.
This implies that the income increase that an individual with rank r and income z gets
by moving from the distribution F to more disperse distribution G is progressive with
both rank r and income z, i.e. G−1(r) − F−1(r) is increasing in rank r for r ∈ (0, 1)
and G−1(F (z))− z increases in z. Finally, when both distributions have finite means,
if F is less dispersed than G then V arF (z) ≤ V arG(z) whenever V arG(z) <∞.
In what follows we will use heavily the location-free feature of the dispersive order,
which implies that adding an arbitrary constant to everyone’s income in one society
(z → z + c where c is a real number) will preserve the dispersive order. This would
imply that F ≺disp G if and only if F (z − c) crosses G(z) at most once and when it
does cross then from below. Shaked (1982, Remark 2.3) pointed out at the following
important consequence of the location-free features of the dispersive order:
F ≺disp G if and only if f(F−1(r)) ≥ g(G−1(r)) whenever r ∈ (0, 1) (9)
That is, for a fixed rank, the more disperse distribution is less dense than the less
dispersed one when compared at the corresponding incomes. Note that because the
condition (9) is expressed in terms of ranks, there is no problem in comparing distrib-
utions with diﬀerent, even disjoint, supports.
The location-free features of the dispersive order imply that the dispersive ordering
does not have a clear relationship with first and second order stochastic dominance,
concepts that may be more familiar to economists. To see that, suppose G(z) is uniform
on [0, 1] and F1(z) is uniform on [0, 0.5], while F2 is uniform on [0.25, 0.75]. One can
verify that the distributions F1 and F2 are equal in the dispersive order, butG dominates
both F1 and F2 in a sense of dispersive order (i.e. F1 ∼disp F2 ≺disp G). However, G first
(and thus second) order stochastically dominates F1, but F2 second (but not first) order
stochastically dominates G (and of course F2 first (and thus second) order stochastically
dominates F1). As will be seen, for the problems that we are concerned with here the
dispersive order will be more useful than stochastic dominance.
There is one final point to make. One might be interested in total or average social
welfare as well as the welfare of individuals. Under the income based approach, it was
diﬃcult to make comparisons. While average social welfare is equal to
R
U(z)dG(z), it
is often diﬃcult to calculate whether it rises. For example, in the situation illustrated
in the right hand side of Figure 1, it is not clear whether average welfare is higher under
income distribution Ga or distribution Gp. Individual utility is lower at each level of
income under Gp. However, as Gp is stochastically higher, there are more rich people,
who have high utility. Overall, the comparison is ambiguous. However, the equivalent
expression for social welfare under the rank approach is
R
U(r)dr. Therefore, if utility
rises at each rank, it is necessarily true that social welfare must have risen.
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4 The Eﬀects of a Change in the Distribution of
Income on Equilibrium Behavior
Suppose a society experiences a change in the distribution of income, or an income
transformation - for example, because of economic growth, or because of redistributive
taxation, or for any other reason. Let us denote the ex-ante cumulative distribution
of income as Ga(z), and the ex-post cumulative distribution of income as Gp(z), each
distribution being continuously diﬀerentiable with densities ga(z) and gp(z) that are
strictly positive on their respective supports. In addition, we assume that the two
distributions are distinct from each other except at a finite number of points (i.e. there
is no interval where the two distributions coincide). Note that, in contrast to Hopkins
and Kornienko (2004), here we do not require the two distributions to have the same
support, even being able to perform the analysis on disjoint supports.
We will consider how changes in the distribution of income aﬀect conspicuous con-
sumption and welfare. We first start with equilibrium strategies. We show that an
increase in income for those with low rank will raise their expenditure on conspicuous
consumption.9
Proposition 2 Suppose that G−1p (r) ≥ G−1a (r) on an interval [0, rˆ] where rˆ is the point
of first crossing of G−1p (r) and G
−1
a (r). Then xp(0) ≥ xa(0) and xp(r) > xa(r) on (0, rˆ].
Note that if the ex post distribution (first order) stochastically dominates the ex
ante distribution this would imply
G−1p (r) ≥ G−1a (r), r ∈ [0, 1]⇔ Gp(z) ≤ Ga(z), z ∈ [0,∞). (10)
Note that this implies that after the change in question, income is (weakly) higher at
every rank in society. Combined with the previous proposition we can see that in a
stochastically higher distribution of income (almost) all individuals will spend more on
conspicuous consumption.
Corollary 1 Suppose that G−1p (r) ≥ G−1a (r) for all r ∈ [0, 1]. Then xp(0) ≥ xa(0) and
xp(r) > xa(r) on (0, 1].
Consider now an income transformation where the poorest individual has an increase
in income, and the ex-post distribution is more dispersed than the ex-ante one, in the
9Strictly speaking, the inequalities of Proposition 2 and subsequent results should be qualified as
only holding almost everywhere. Specifically, equality between xp and xa is possible at isolated points
where both G−1a (r) = G
−1
p (r) and ga(G
−1
a (r)) = gp(G
−1
p (r)) hold simultaneously. Of course, we could
rule this out with further technical assumptions designed specifically to exclude this possibility. How-
ever, the only result where such a non-generic situation may be qualitatively important is Proposition
3 below, where we cannot rule out the possibility of a such a non-generic crossing of xp and xa at the
point of interest.
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sense of the dispersion order introduced in the previous section. In fact, it is easy to
see that such an income transformation results in an ex-post distribution first-order
dominating the ex-ante one. Thus we have the following simple result.
Corollary 2 Suppose that
G−1p (0) ≥ G−1a (0) (11)
and also
gp(G
−1
p (r)) ≤ ga(G−1a (r)) for all r ∈ (0, 1)⇔ Gp Âdisp Ga (12)
then, xp(0) ≥ xa(0) and xp(r) > xa(r) on (0, 1].
However, as we will show in the next section, the increased aﬄuence of those at the
“bottom”, by pushing those “further up” to spend more on conspicuous goods, will tend
to adversely aﬀect the welfare of those in the “middle” - regardless of what happened
to their incomes. Thus, even if everyone in the economy is richer, it does not necessary
mean that everyone is happier.
Proposition 2 is also instrumental in understanding what happens if the distribution
of income becomes more equal, for example, when a redistributive taxation scheme is
imposed. Using similar reasoning, we now look at consumption decisions when income
becomes more equal, or less dispersed in a sense of the dispersive ordering. Such a
transformation implies that the distributions cross at some point rˆ (the dispersive order
and our assumption that the two distributions are almost everywhere distinct imply that
there would be at most one such point). Then everyone at the lower end of the income
hierarchy up to the individual with rank rˆ will have a higher income and spend more
on conspicuous consumption. This is over and beyond the standard eﬀect of increased
income on the demand for a normal good, because the individual with rank rˆ will
spend more on conspicuous consumption even though her income has not changed.
All those who are “below” her in the income hierarchy have become richer after the
transformation, and thus are able to aﬀord more conspicuous consumption. As the
result, in order to “keep up” her social rank (as determined by the relative position in
the consumption hierarchy), the individual with rank rˆ now has to spend more.
Corollary 3 Suppose that
G−1p (0) ≥ G−1a (0) (13)
and also
gp(G
−1
p (r)) ≥ ga(G−1a (r)) for all r ∈ (0, 1)⇔ Ga Âdisp Gp (14)
and also suppose that
G−1p (1) ≤ G−1a (1) (15)
Then, xp(0) ≥ xa(0) and xp(r) > xa(r) on (0, rˆ] where rˆ is the only point of crossing of
G−1a (r) and G
−1
p (r).
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Here, everyone at the lower end of the income hierarchy, and possibly everyone, spends
more on conspicuous consumption - including the individual with rank rˆ whose income
does not change (the location-free properties of the dispersive order together with the
smaller range of Gp ensures that there is exactly one point rˆ). This result implies, by
continuity of the equilibrium strategy x(r), that those with slightly higher ranks (and
thus lower incomes) also will have to spend more on conspicuous consumption even
though they have lower ex-post income. In other words, the increased aﬄuence of those
at the “bottom” of the social hierarchy forces those in the “middle” to spend more on
conspicuous consumption in order to “keep up” their social “place”. This can be further
demonstrated by the following example.
Example 1 Suppose zp = (1− τ)za + τµa, τ ∈ (0, 1), where µa is the mean income of
the ex-ante income distribution Ga. This is a mean-preserving income transformation
(so that µp = µa) and it is equivalent to a redistributive scheme whereby everyone is
taxed at a flat rate of τ and given a lump transfer of τµa. Those with income that is
initially lower than average (i.e. with za < µa) get an income subsidy, while those with
above average income see their incomes taxed away. An arbitrary ex-ante distribution
Ga crosses the corresponding ex-post distribution Gp from above at the mean income
µa, so that the individual with mean income µa sees no change in neither rank nor
income. However, by Proposition 2 she spends more on conspicuous consumption, i.e.
xp(G
−1
p (µa)) > xa(G
−1
a (µa)). By continuity, those with slightly above average incomes
will also spend more on conspicuous goods, even though their incomes are lower.
5 The Eﬀects of a Change in the Distribution of
Income on Equilibrium Utility
In this section, we will explore equilibriumwelfare in the game of status when individuals
are indexed by their rank. We begin with the following important question. Given the
existence of relative concerns, what kind of income transformation would guarantee that
everyone in the economy is better oﬀ? Recall that if we take the standard self-centered
approach to the consumer choice problem, the answer is trivial - increase everyone’s
income, and everyone in the economy would be better oﬀ. Yet a number of empirical
studies pointed out that economic growth is not unequivocally happiness-enhancing.
While most researchers agree that this may be because of the existence of relative
concerns, there is still little understanding of why relative concerns may reduce the
benefits from economic growth (increased income).
In this section we will oﬀer a suﬃcient condition for an increase in the happiness level
for everyone when relative concerns are present. We demonstrate that an increase in
each individual’s income by itself cannot constitute a suﬃcient condition for a uniform
increase in happiness. Instead, what one needs is a reduction in “competitive pressures”
which follows from a greater dispersion of income, coupled with the Rawlsian-style
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requirement that the individual at the bottom of the social hierarchy becomes richer.
In this section, we consider equilibrium utility which is U(r) = V (x(r), G−1(r) −
px(r))(S0 + r). Using the envelope theorem, one can find that the marginal change in
the equilibrium utility from change in rank is:10
U 0(r) =
dU(r)
dr
=
∂U(x, y, S)
∂r
= V2(x,G
−1(r)− px)(S0 + r)
dG−1(r)
dr
(16)
That is, the marginal return to happiness from rank depends on the density of the
individual’s “social space”. Remember that from (8), dG−1/dr = 1/g(z).
Again we compare outcomes under an ex ante distribution of income Ga and an ex
post distribution Gp. The respective equilibrium utilities are Ua(r) = V (xa(r), G−1a (r)−
pxa(r))(S0+r) and Up(r) = V (xp(r), G−1p (r)−pxp(r))(S0+r). We first look at an arbi-
trary income transformation that leaves some people with both unchanged incomes and
ranks, and among these individuals, we look at the poorest one. The next proposition
shows that such an individual will be worse oﬀ whenever those below her in the income
hierarchy become more aﬄuent.11
Proposition 3 Suppose that G−1p (r) ≥ G−1a (r) on an interval (0, rˆ), where rˆ is the
point of the first crossing of G−1a and G
−1
p . Then Up(rˆ) < Ua(rˆ).
This result says that if incomes rise but some individual at rank rˆ does not have
her income increased, she is not indiﬀerent but is strictly worse oﬀ. This is because the
social pressure of others’ higher incomes forces her to increase conspicuous consumption.
Note that, by continuity, some people with rank just less than rˆ will also be worse oﬀ,
even though they now have higher income.
One might think that in order to avoid this problem and for everyone in the society
to be better oﬀ, we simply have to increase the income of everyone. Yet, as the following
example demonstrates, under relative concerns, higher income at every rank in society
does not imply greater happiness for all.
Example 2 Suppose that U = xyS, with S0 = 0 and Ga is uniform on [0, 1], and
consider a linear income transformation of income zp = 0.25za + 1.5, so that Gp is
10As we mentioned before in footnote 5, the analysis of equilibrium utility under rank-indexing
approach is more diﬃcult than under income-indexing approach. To see that, compare equation (16)
with the analogous equation under income-indexing approach (found in the proof of the Proposition 2
of Hopkins and Kornienko (2004)):
dU(z)
dz
=
dU(r)
dr
dr
dG−1(r)
=
dU(r)
dr
g(z) = V2(S0 +G(z))
Thus, under rank-indexing, the analysis of equilibrium utilities is complicated by the presence of the
reciprocal of the income density, 1/g(z).
11An implication of the issue we raised in footnote 9 is that it is possible that Up(rˆ) = Ua(rˆ) in the
non-generic situation we identified there.
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uniform on [1.5, 1.75]. Then Up(r) > Ua(r) for all r ∈ (0, 0.9), while Up(r) < Ua(r) for
all r ∈ (0.9, 1].
Notice that in the above example Gp first order stochastically dominates Ga, and
everyone is (vastly) richer ex-post. Under the standard self-centered paradigm, that
would imply that everyone would be happier ex-post as well. Yet this is not the case and
indeed only 90 percent of the population is happier. This is because the transformation
that raised incomes also compressed them. More compressed distributions give rise to
greater social competition.
That is, in the games of status not only income, but also the degree of social com-
petitiveness that matter. This gives rise to simple suﬃcient conditions for everyone
to be happier. Incomes must be raised but at the same time, social competition must
not rise. For this to be true, the distribution of income must not become any more
compressed in the sense of the dispersive order.
Proposition 4 Suppose that
G−1p (0) ≥ G−1a (0) (17)
and also
gp(G
−1
p (r)) ≤ ga(G−1a (r)) for all r ∈ (0, 1)⇔ Gp Âdisp Ga (18)
then Up(0) ≥ Ua(0) and Up(r) > Ua(r) for all r ∈ (0, 1].
In other words, in order for everyone to be happier, we need, first, the poorest
person to be no worse in terms of income (and thus of happiness - reminiscent of
Rawls’ criterion) and, second, a decrease in “competitive pressures” (as represented by
the income density of people with similar rank). Note that together they imply that
incomes are strictly higher at every rank. (Intuitively, since the lowest person is no
worse oﬀ, the only way to make incomes more dispersed is to spread them upwards.)
However, recall that we saw earlier in Example 2 that a general increase in income may
not be suﬃcient to increase happiness if the “competitiveness criterion” of the equation
(18) is not satisfied. That is, the reduction in social pressure implicit in (18) is essential
for greater income to be beneficial for all.
We have looked at the case where the income transformation results in an increase
in incomes. We now look at what happens when there is redistribution of a fixed level
of total income.
Example 3 Suppose that U = xyS, with S0 = 0, and Ga is uniform on [0, 1], and
consider a linear income transformation zp = 0.5za + 0.25. Then Up(r) > Ua(r) for all
r ∈ (0, 0.35), while Up(r) < Ua(r) for all r ∈ (0.35, 1].
Notice that the income transformation of the above example is a mean-preserving
redistribution scheme of the type considered in the Example 1. Here, the bottom half of
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the population is richer ex-post, yet only the poorest 70 percent of them (and thus the
poorest 35 percent of the entire population) is better oﬀ! The remaining 30 percent of
those whom become richer (which is 15 percent of the population) and all of those who
became poorer (that is the 50 percent of the entire population) is worse oﬀ. That is,
the above mean-preserving scheme, by redistributing income from the richest half of the
population to to the poorest half, makes happier the poorest 35 percent of population,
at the expense of the decreased happiness of 65 percent of the population.
We can generalize the above example as follows. Suppose we change the income
distribution so that it less dispersed than before. We do this by increasing the incomes
of those with low ranks and decreasing the incomes of those with high ranks, and
increasing social competitiveness. Of course, this is consistent with the examples of
redistributive policies above. Then, we can show that the middle and upper classes are
worse oﬀ in this more equal society.
Proposition 5 Suppose that
G−1p (0) ≥ G−1a (0) (19)
and also
gp(G
−1
p (r)) ≥ ga(G−1a (r)) for all r ∈ (0, 1)⇔ Ga Âdisp Gp (20)
and also suppose that that
G−1p (1) ≤ G−1a (1) (21)
Then, Up(0) ≥ Ua(0) and Up(r) < Ua(r) for all r ∈ [rˆ, 1] where rˆ is the only point of
crossing of G−1p (r) and G
−1
a (r).
Notice that Gp is less dispersed than Ga in the sense of the dispersive order. The
result implies that a simple redistributive scheme, which takes from those with above
average income to supplement the income of those with below average income, will
reduce the utility of the middle and upper classes. Of course, it is unsurprising that
the rich would not benefit from such a scheme. However, an individual whose income
is unchanged (the one with rank rˆ) is strictly worse oﬀ and by continuity this will also
apply to some “lower middle class” individuals who have less than average income.
This is even though they have higher income post distribution. This is because the
more compact income distribution after tax implies greater social competition, greater
expenditure on conspicuous consumption and lower utility.
We lastly point out that as long as the the social competition is not too extreme
(i.e. S0 > 0) individuals at the very bottom of the distribution will be strictly better
oﬀ when the very poorest individual is strictly richer.
Proposition 6 Suppose that
G−1p (0) > G
−1
a (0) (22)
If S0 > 0, then there exist r˜ ∈ (0, 1] such that Up(r) > Ua(r) on [0, r˜).
18
That is, as long as the poorest individual does not face extreme social competition,
additional income for the poorest will make them better oﬀ. This is because when
S0 > 0, the lowest ranked do not take part in social competition (see (7)) and so do
not waste the additional income on conspicuous consumption. One should not take the
result that the very poor may benefit from extra income as trivial, because, as the next
example shows, once the poorest individual faces extreme social competition of S0 = 0,
those at the very bottom of the distribution can be worse oﬀ, as the benefits of higher
income are dissipated by high social competition.
Example 4 Suppose U = yxaS, with S0 = 0. Then we have U(0) = 0 irrespective of
income and U 0(r) = xar/g(r). Suppose we look at an income transformation such as in
Proposition 6 that raises the income of the poorest at the same time as increasing the
density. The utility of the poorest is unchanged at zero, but if a is small and the change
in density large, U 0p(r) < U
0
a(r) in the neighbourhood of r = 0 and so those at the very
bottom of the distribution are worse oﬀ in the more equal situation.
6 Non-Rank-Preserving Income Transformations
We have been trying to emphasize that, when relative concerns are present, changes
in the income distribution can aﬀect agents through three channels: one’s own income,
one’s relative position or rank in the distribution, and the shape of the distribution.
Our earlier methodology (HK) allows one to analyze individual decisions and utility
for fixed incomes, but is limited to comparing distributions with the same support.
Our current methodology allows one to make this analysis for fixed ranks, and thus
is particularly suitable for analyzing rank-preserving income transformations (such as
linear transformations of the form zp = a+ bza).
In this section, we present some situations which would seem to defeat both methods.
For example, suppose that incomes change in a manner that is not rank preserving and
which changes the support of the distributions. Nonetheless, one can still get some
understanding of what happens employing the rank-indexing approach augmented by
the use of a rank transformation function. Moreover, these situations highlight the
importance of the third factor of analysis - the social competitiveness (defined as g(z)
in the income space or dG
−1(r)
dr
in the rank space).
Let us start with the following example.
Example 5 Suppose U = xyS, with S0 ≥ 0. Suppose Ga is uniform on [1, 2], and
consider an inequality-reducing transformation whereby that the “lower half” (or every-
one with ex ante incomes of [1, 1.5)) receives an income subsidy of 0.5, but the “upper
half” (or everyone with ex ante incomes of [1.5, 2]) sees no change in incomes. Then
all incomes are now distributed according to Gp, which is uniform on [1.5, 2].
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Here ex post everyone faces a uniform distribution on [1.5, 2], and their conspicuous
consumption choices are still determined by the equation (5). Given that the ex post
distribution first order dominates the ex ante distribution, by Corollary 1, for every
fixed rank, everyone spends more on conspicuous consumption. However, here, the
rank-indexing approach alone is not suﬃcient to analyze what happens to equilibrium
utility of every individual. This is because this is an example of non-rank-preserving
income transformation since in the new, post-transformation, society, individuals with
ex-ante ranks of 0 and 0.5 both now have rank of 0, individuals with ex-ante rank of
0.1 and 0.6 both now have rank of 0.2, individuals with ex-ante rank of 0.49 and 0.99
both now have rank of 0.98, and so on.
However what we can do is to carry on the analysis based on rank indexing by
constructing a rank transformation R : ra → rp implied by this income transformation.
Here it is, rp = 2ra for ra ∈ [0, 1/2) and rp = 2ra− 1 for ra ∈ [1/2, 1]. As the result, the
ex-ante “lower half” sees an increase in both income and rank, while the “upper half”
sees a decrease in rank and no change in income. Clearly, the bottom individual (i.e.
the one with ex ante rank of 0) will have an ex post rank of 0 and a higher income,
and thus will be no worse oﬀ after the income transformation. But those near the top
of the bottom half (e.g. the one with ex ante rank just below 0.5) will have an ex post
rank of just below 1 and higher income and will be better oﬀ. In contrast, everyone
in the ex-ante “upper half” sees no change in incomes, but a decrease in ex-ante rank,
and an increase in density of individuals around them. In fact, one can show that they
will be worse oﬀ after the income transformation. Thus, using rank-indexing method,
combined with rank transformation, one can do analysis for non-rank-preserving income
transformations.
Non-rank-preserving transformations in fact highlight the importance of the third
factor aﬀecting one’s choices and well-being, namely, the density of the individual so-
cial space, or social competitiveness. As we pointed out before, an increase in equality
implies an increase in social competitiveness. While in the above example the eﬀect
was not strong enough to oﬀset the eﬀect of increased income, Example 6 below demon-
strates that one should not discard the importance of the social density. That is, one
can experience an increase in income and increase in rank, but a decrease in utility
because of an increase in social density, and thus an increase in competitive pressures.
Example 6 Suppose U = xyS, with S0 = 0.1. Suppose Ga is uniform on [1, 2], and
consider the following inequality-reducing transformation of income: everyone with in-
comes of [1, 1.1) receive an income subsidy of 0.9, everyone with incomes of [1.1, 1.2)
receive an income subsidy of 0.8, and so on, with everyone with incomes of [1.8, 1.9)
receiving an income subsidy of 0.1, while those with incomes of [1.9, 2.0] face no change
in income. Then all incomes are now distributed with Gp, which is uniform on [1.9, 2].
Again, this is not a rank-preserving income transformation since in the new, post-
transformation, society, everyone with ex-ante incomes of 1, 1.1, 1.2, . . . , 1.9 (and thus
ex-ante ranks of 0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9) now have ex-post rank of 0, everyone with incomes of
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Figure 3: Social competitiveness g(z) is important. When most individuals receive an
increase in income, while being “squeezed” into a small income range, the increased
aﬄuence of the “bottom” of the society pushes the rest of the society to increase their
conspicuous consumption x(r) in order to “keep up”. This may result in some individ-
uals getting lower utility even though both their income and rank increase. Ex-ante
choices and utilities are represented by solid curves, while ex-post ones are represented
by dashed curves. (Example 6: Ga is uniform on [1, 2], Gp is uniform on [1.9, 2],
U = xyS, S0 = 0.1 ).
1.05, 1.15, 1.25, . . . , 1.95 (and thus ranks of 0.05, 0.15, 0.25, . . . , 0.95) now have income
rank of 0.5, everyone with incomes of 1.099, 1.199, 1.299, . . . , 1.999 (and thus ranks
of 0.099, 0.199, 0.299, . . . , 0.999) now have ex-post rank of 0.99. The corresponding
rank transformation R : ra → rp implied by this income transformation is as follows:
rp = 10ra for ra ∈ [0, 0.1); rp = 10(ra−0.1) for ra ∈ [0.1, 0.2), . . . , and rp = 10(ra−0.9)
for ra ∈ [0.9, 1] (Figure 3a). Here, ex post everyone faces a uniform distribution on
[1.9, 2] (Figure 3b), and thus, given their ex-post income and rank, their conspicuous
consumption choices are determined by the equation (5) (Figure 3c).
One can see from Figure 3d that almost two thirds of the society are worse oﬀ after
the transformation, even though 90 percent faced an increase in income. While the
individuals varied in what happened to their rank (those above the 45 degree line in
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Figure 3a faced an increase in rank, those below the line faced a decrease, those on
the line faced no change), yet uniformly all faced an increase in social competitiveness -
which as we argue, is important in games of status. For example, consider an individual
with ex-ante income of 1.45 and rank 0.45, whose ex-ante utility is 0.17. After she
receives a subsidy of 0.5, her ex-post income increases to 1.95, her rank increases to 0.5,
but her utility goes down to 0.12. Needless to say, those with ex ante rank [0.9, 1] who
had no change in income, now have lower rank, and face higher competitive pressures,
and thus are worse oﬀ.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we presented an alternative approach to the games of status introduced
in our earlier paper (Hopkins and Kornienko (2004)). There we followed tradition and
looked at consumer choice as a function of income. Thus the comparative static analysis
of the eﬀects of social aﬄuence and income equality on consumer choices and welfare
was done at a fixed level of income. Here, we look at the same situation but instead we
index agents by their rank. The results in this context look surprisingly diﬀerent, even
though the fundamental insights remain robust to the change in the indexing paradigm.
The main new result is a suﬃcient condition for an increase in each individual’s
equilibrium utility. This involves non-decreased income for the society’s poorest indi-
vidual, plus an increase in the dispersion of incomes that leads to a decrease in social
competitiveness. Together, these two conditions ensure that income at each rank level
increases (and thus an increase of social aﬄuence in terms of first-order stochastic dom-
inance), and in equilibrium, results in higher utility at each rank level. Compare this
to our earlier results for the income-indexing approach, where we had the apparently
contradictory result that an increase in social aﬄuence in terms of first-order stochastic
dominance leads to a decrease in equilibrium utility at every level of income.
It is important to understand that these contrasting results are nonetheless consis-
tent. When one examines the eﬀect of an increase in social aﬄuence using the income-
indexing approach, one is looking at individuals whose income did not change, and so
who did not gain from this social transformation. In fact, these individuals also face
greater social competition from those who gained and their utility falls. In contrast,
when one compares ex ante and ex post utilities at a constant rank, under this type of
transformation an individual of a given rank will have a higher income. If the benefits
of higher income are not outweighed by greater social competition, utility will rise. But
this does not conflict with the result that individuals whose income is unchanged would
see a fall in utility.
Another important insight is that, regardless whether we index individuals by their
rank or their income, those whose income is left unchanged by the income transforma-
tion, tend to be adversely aﬀected by the increased aﬄuence of those who are below
them in the income hierarchy. This is because, in order to “keep up” their social posi-
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tion, they have to increase their consumption of conspicuous goods further above what
would be privately optimal, leading to a decline in welfare. That is, it is the unchanged
income of the poor that was the main culprit behind our earlier result that “equality
hurts the poor”. Once we allow the income of the poor to increase (which sometimes
may lead to greater equality), the poor will be better oﬀ.
Our third main insight is that in the games of status not only income and rank,
but also social density, or competitiveness, matter. We demonstrate that one can have
higher income and higher rank, but nevertheless have lower well-being because of the
increase in social competitiveness. Note that such income transformation is non-rank
preserving, yet we still were able to utilize the rank-indexing approach by augmenting it
with a rank transformation function. In fact, income indexing approach can be reduced
to a rank indexing approach with a suitable rank transformation.
Thus, given the similarities and diﬀerences in the two approaches, the question arises
- if one is interested in analyzing what happens when relative concerns are present, which
approach should one take? We think that our earlier approach based on indexing by
income or endowment is well suited for some problems. The first such case is where
income transformations diﬀerentially aﬀect diﬀerent types of income - for instance, it
aﬀects only unearned income but does not aﬀect earned income, and vice versa, without
changing the lowest income. Given that individuals may vary in their income compo-
sition, income-indexing can help to understand what happens to individuals who have
only one type of income (say, earned). Another situation would be one where individ-
uals make decisions based on their unchangeable abilities, or talents, and suppose that
immigration changed the composition of abilities in the country. Here, the endowment-
based approach would allow one to compare the decisions and well-being of domestic
workers whose abilities were left unchanged by the influx of new people.
However, we now think that the rank-indexing approach is likely to be more generally
fruitful in problems of social comparison. This is because it happens to be easier, allows
for a wider set of comparative static predictions, and simply seems to make better sense.
In particular, it avoids the most pessimistic of conclusions of the previous approach:
that greater equality hurts the poor. We also hope that this theoretical investigation
will prove useful for empirical analysis of the links between the distribution of income
and happiness. In particular, it makes clear that the results one obtains will depend on
one’s choice of the method of social comparison.
Nonetheless, both our earlier and present papers show that, when relative concerns
are present, people will respond to an increase in the aﬄuence of those who are below
them by increasing their own conspicuous consumption in order to maintain their social
position. Thus, whether we take the rank- or income-indexing approach, any policy
that increases incomes of the lower classes without a suﬃcient increase in the incomes
of the middle classes, will tend to decrease the latter’s welfare. Depending on the extent
of the policy, it may make the upper classes worse oﬀ as well. In other words, whichever
method of comparison is used, in these models of relative concerns, the middle classes
may be worse oﬀ with policies that change the distribution of endowments in a way
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that has been traditionally considered to be progressive.
We should point out, however, that this work is best interpreted as an investigation
of the logical consistency of the argument that social preferences such as desires for
rank or status imply that greater equality is necessarily beneficial. While we find that
in fact greater equality in this type of model increases social pressures to consume, this
is not in itself an argument for maintaining or extending existing inequality. Rather the
policy implications are that interventions to increase equality would work better if ac-
companied by consumption taxes to alleviate the resulting increased social pressures. A
similar point is made by Corneo (2002) who suggests that similar considerations may lie
behind the Scandinavian model. That is, the high levels of taxation in these countries
may serve to reduce visible consumption that otherwise would be highly competitive
given their low pre-tax income inequality. Finally, further research (Hopkins and Ko-
rnienko (2005)) indicates that, in a similar model of social competition, diﬀerent forms
of equality can have quite diﬀerent eﬀects.
Appendix
Lemma 1 Consider a pair of distributions Ga(z) and Gp(z) which are distinct from
each other except at a finite number of points, both continuously diﬀerentiable with
positive densities on the respective supports. If the corresponding equilibrium strategies
are xa(r) and xp(r), then at any point r˘ such that xa(r˘) = xp(r˘), the sign of x0a(r˘)−x0p(r˘)
is equal to the sign of G−1a (r˘)−G−1p (r˘).
Proof of Lemma 1:First note that, given the equation (5), we have that
x0a(r)
x0p(r)
=
φ(xa, G
−1
a (r))
φ(xp, G−1p (r))
(23)
so that any point where xa = xp the relative slope only depends on G−1a and G
−1
p , and
thus the slopes are equal whenever G−1a and G
−1
p are equal. Furthermore, given our
assumptions that Vii ≤ 0 and Vij ≥ 0, we have that
∂φ
∂G−1(r)
=
V2
pV2 − V1
− V (pV22 − V12)
(pV2 − V1)2
> 0 (24)
Thus, at any point where xa(r) = xp(r) we have that x0a > x
0
p (so that xa is steeper than
xp and thus crosses xp from below) whenever G−1a (r) > G
−1
p (r) (i.e. whenever ex-ante
income exceeds ex-post income), and vice versa.
Proof of Proposition 2: By the boundary conditions (7), the condition G−1a (0) ≤
G−1p (0) implies that xp(0) ≥ xa(0) (i.e. that the poorest individual, now that she has
more income, spends more on conspicuous consumption). Given our assumption that
Ga and Gp are distinct it follows that G−1p (r) > G
−1
a (r) almost everywhere on (0, rˆ].
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Thus, by Lemma 1, xp(r) can only cross xa(r) from below except perhaps at the finite
number of points where G−1p (r) = G
−1
a (r).
We first rule out that that there is an interval where xp(r) ≤ xa(r). Suppose on the
contrary there exist at least one interval [r1, r2] ⊆ [0, rˆ] such that xp(r) ≤ xa(r). By the
continuity of xa and xp, it must be that xp(r1) = xa(r1). Note that
∂φ
∂x
=
−(V1 − pV2)2 − V (pV21 − pV22 − V11 + pV12)
(pV2 − V1)2
< 0. (25)
By a combination of Lemma 1 and (25), it would follow that x0a(r) < x
0
p(r) almost
everywhere on [r1, r2], which combined with xa(r1) = xp(r1) is a contradiction to xp(r) ≤
xa(r) on the interval. Thus, xp(r) > xa(r) almost everywhere on [0, rˆ].
We next rule out that xp(r) = xa(r) at individual points. By Lemma 1 and the
previous argument that excludes intervals where xp(r) ≤ xa(r), this is only possible
at the isolated points where G−1p (r) = G
−1
a (r). But at any such point r˜ on (0, rˆ], as
G−1p (r) > G
−1
a (r) almost everywhere, we have that gp(G
−1
p (r˜)) ≥ ga(G−1a (r˜)). Now, note
that G−1p (r˜) = G
−1
a (r˜) = z˜. Next, we invoke the income indexing approach and consider
solutions to the game in terms of income z, that is, solutions to the diﬀerential equation
dx(z)
dz
=
µ
g(z)
S0 +G(z)
¶µ
V
pV2 − V1
¶
=
dx(r)
dr
dr
dz
=
dx(r)
dr
g(z) (26)
that we write xp(z) and xa(z) for the respective distributions. Then if xp(r˜) = xa(r˜),
it must be that xp(z˜) = xa(z˜). As xp(r) > xa(r) for r in (r˜ − , r˜) for some  > 0,
we must have xp(z) > xa(z) for incomes slightly less than z˜. Note that by Lemma
1, x0p(r˜) = x
0
a(r˜), and for the case of gp(z˜) > ga(z˜), it must be that x
0
p(z˜) > x
0
a(z˜) so
that xp(z) crosses xa(z) from below, which is a contradiction. This leaves us with the
possibility, as was mentioned in footnote 9, that it is possible that xp(r) = xa(r) in a
non-generic case of gp(G−1p (r˜)) = ga(G
−1
a (r˜)).
Proof of Proposition 3: Notice that since rˆ is the point of crossing of G−1a and
G−1p , this implies that G
−1
p (rˆ) = G
−1
a (rˆ) = zˆ: an agent of this rank has the same
income zˆ ex ante and ex post. Note that as G−1p crosses G
−1
a from above, we have
gp(G
−1
p (rˆ)) ≥ ga(G−1a (rˆ)). Again, for the non-generic case of gp(G−1p (rˆ)) = ga(G−1a (rˆ)),
we cannot rule out that xp(rˆ) = xa(rˆ) and thus that Up(rˆ) = Ua(rˆ). Yet for the
case of gp(G−1p (rˆ)) > ga(G
−1
a (rˆ)), Proposition 2 implies that xp(rˆ) > xa(rˆ), so this
agent now spends more on conspicuous consumption. By Proposition 1, in equilibrium
x > xc, consumption exceeds the level that maximizes regular utility V . By the strict
quasiconcavity of V , given a fixed level of income, V (x, z − x) is strictly decreasing in
x for x > xc. This implies that Up(rˆ) > Ua(rˆ).
Proof of Proposition 4: First, as income is (weakly) higher at r = 0 by the boundary
conditions (7), xp(0) ≥ xa(0) and yp(0) ≥ ya(0), so that Up(0) ≥ Ua(0) (i.e. as the
poorest individual has no reduction in income she will not be worse oﬀ). Second, notice
that Up(r) > Ua(r) if and only if Vp(r) = V (xp(r), yp(r)) < V (xa(r), ya(r)) = Va(r).
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Finally, the condition (18) implies that
g−1p (r) =
dG−1p (r)
dr
≥ dG
−1
a (r)
dr
= g−1a (r) for all r ∈ [0, 1]
In other words, G−1p (r) is (weakly) steeper thanG
−1
a (r) on [0, 1], so that clearlyG
−1
p (r) ≥
G−1a (r) for r ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose that Up(0) > Ua(0), and suppose, in contradiction to the
claim we are trying to prove, that Up(r) equals Ua(r) at least once on (0, 1). Denote
the first such point as r1 ∈ (0, 1) and notice that it must be that V (xp(r1), yp(r1)) =
V (xa(r1), ya(r1)). But since by Corollary 1, xp(r) > xa(r) on (0, 1], it must be that
yp(r) < ya(r) in the neighborhood of r1. Furthermore, dV2 = V21dx+ V22dy, and, given
our original assumptions on V , it thus must be that V2(xp(r), yp(r)) > V2(xa(r), ya(r))
in a neighborhood of r1. Using the marginal utility condition (16), combined with
the density condition (18), it must be that U 0p(r) > U
0
a(r) in a neighborhood of r1, so
that Up(r) can only be steeper than Ua(r), and thus can only cross from below. Given
Up(0) > Ua(0), we are done.
If instead we have that Up(0) = Ua(0), then, by the above argument which rules
out that Up can cross Ua from above, the claim can only fail if there is an interval
(0, r˜) on which Up(r) ≤ Ua(r). Then, there must exist a point r2 ∈ (0, r˜) such that
U 0p(r2) ≤ U 0a(r2) and V (xp(r2), yp(r2)) ≤ V (xa(r2), ya(r2)). But given (16) and the
density condition (18), if U 0p(r2) ≤ U 0a(r2) then V2(xp(r2), yp(r2)) ≤ V2(xa(r2), ya(r2)) at
r2, which can only happen if yp(r2) ≥ ya(r2). But this, combined with the fact that
xp(r2) > xa(r2) (by Proposition 2) implies that V (xp(r2), yp(r2)) > V (xa(r2), ya(r2)),
which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5: Notice again that Ua(r) > Up(r) if and only if Va(r) =
V (xa(r), ya(r)) > V (xp(r), yp(r)) = Vp(r). From Proposition 2, we have xp(rˆ) > xa(rˆ).
We can then consider two cases. First, suppose that xp(r) ≥ xa(r) on [rˆ, 1]. Then, as
wealth for individuals with rank (rˆ, 1] is strictly lower ex-post than ex-ante, we have
necessarily yp(r) < ya(r) on [rˆ, 1]. Now, as xp(r) ≥ xa(r) and yp(r) < ya(r), we then for
some r˜ can find a pair (x˜, y˜) such that px˜+ y˜ = pxp+yp (that is, (x˜, y˜) are feasible given
ex-post wealth) but xcp < x˜ < xp and y˜ = ya. But then, V (xp(r), yp(r)) < V (x˜, y˜) <
V (xa(r), ya(r)), and the result follows.
Suppose now instead that xp(r) < xa(r) for some r in (r1, r2) with r1 > rˆ. If
yp(r) ≤ ya(r) on that interval, it is clear that Vp(r) < Va(r) and we are done. Suppose
instead that yp(r) > ya(r) on some interval (r3, r4) with r4 ≤ r2 (as incomes are lower ex
post for r > rˆ, it must be that r3 > r1). We want to rule out the possibility of Up(r) ≥
Ua(r) somewhere on this interval. Now, it must be the case that Vp(r3) < Va(r3) as
xp(r3) < xa(r3) and yp(r3) = ya(r3). We have gp(r) ≥ ga(r) everywhere. Furthermore,
dV2 = V21dx+V22dy. Given that x decreases and y increases ex post on (r3, r4) and our
original assumptions on V , it can be calculated that, given (16), that U 0p(r) < U
0
a(r) on
this interval. Combined with Up(r3) < Ua(r3), the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 6: If S0 > 0 we must have Up(0) > Ua(0), simply because by
assumption G−1p (0) > G
−1
a (0), the lowest ranked individual has strictly higher income
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ex post. Since by the boundary condition (7), the lowest ranked individual spends the
cooperative amount and behaves like a neoclassical consumer, a strictly higher income
must make her strictly better oﬀ. Higher utility on some interval [0, r˜) then follows by
continuity of U(r).
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